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Abstract
Most health insurance markets with premium-rate restrictions include a risk equalization system to compensate insurers for 
predictable variation in spending. Recent research has shown, however, that even the most sophisticated risk equalization 
systems tend to undercompensate (overcompensate) groups of people with poor (good) self-reported health, confronting 
insurers with incentives for risk selection. Self-reported health measures are generally considered infeasible for use as an 
explicit ‘risk adjuster’ in risk equalization models. This study examines an alternative way to exploit this information, 
namely through ‘constrained regression’ (CR). To do so, we use administrative data (N = 17 m) and health survey informa-
tion (N = 380 k) from the Netherlands. We estimate five CR models and compare these models with the actual Dutch risk 
equalization model of 2016 which was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). In the CR models, the estimated coef-
ficients are restricted, such that the under-/overcompensation for groups based on self-reported general health is reduced 
by 20, 40, 60, 80, or 100%. Our results show that CR can improve outcomes for groups that are not explicitly flagged by 
risk adjuster variables, but worsens outcomes for groups that are explicitly flagged by risk adjuster variables. Using a new 
standardized metric that summarizes under-/overcompensation for both types of groups, we find that the lighter constraints 
can lead to better outcomes than OLS.
Keywords Health insurance · Risk equalization · Risk selection · Constrained regression · Survey data
JEL Classification I10-Health · G22-Insurance, insurance companies, actuarial studies · H51-Government expenditures and 
health
Introduction
Many health insurance systems are based on the model of 
regulated competition. Competition among health insurers 
helps to improve efficiency of health insurance systems and 
regulation helps to protect public objectives like individual 
affordability of health plans. One element of the regulatory 
framework is risk equalization, a mechanism that com-
pensates health insurers for predictable spending variation 
across individuals [34, 35]. In the presence of premium-rate 
restrictions, as applied in (almost) all regulated health insur-
ance markets, risk equalization mitigates incentives for risk 
selection.
Over the past decades, risk equalization systems have 
evolved from simple demographic models to sophisticated 
health-based models. An example of the latter is the model 
applied in the Netherlands, which includes risk adjusters 
based on an extensive series of demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and morbidity-based variables. Even these sophis-
ticated models, however, do not completely correct for pre-
dictable spending variation [13, 23, 30]. Van Kleef et al. [31] 
find that the Dutch risk equalization model of 2016 under-
compensates health insurers for the group of consumers who 
reported a fair or (very) poor health status in the prior year 
and overcompensates them for the group of consumers who 
reported a (very) good health status in the prior year. On 
average, the former group (about 24% of the population) 
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confronts health insurers with a predictable loss of around 
500 euros per person per year, while the latter (about 75% 
of the population) confronts them with a predictable profit 
of around 180 euros per person per year [31].
Correlation between consumers’ (self-reported) health 
and their profitability to health insurers can be problematic 
for the functioning of health insurance markets. When the 
unprofitable groups in poor health value (specific features 
of) health plans differently than the profitable groups in 
good health, health insurers are confronted with incentives 
to design their plans in a way that these are more attrac-
tive to healthy consumers than to unhealthy consumers. 
For instance, health insurers might refrain from contract-
ing high-quality care for unprofitable groups with particular 
chronic medical conditions [10, 11]. These actions, which 
we refer to as selection via plan design, threaten the effi-
ciency of health plans [12, 15, 17, 25, 27, 36].
This paper seeks to mitigate incentives for selection via 
plan design by incorporating health survey information in 
the risk equalization model. However, direct use of self-
reported health measures as a basis for risk adjusters is 
problematic, because the required survey information is not 
available for the entire population (which is typically con-
sidered a requirement for calculating individual-level risk 
equalization payments). Collecting this information for the 
entire population would usually be considered too cumber-
some and costly [34].
Although self-reported health measures are not appropri-
ate as a basis for risk adjusters, they can be used indirectly in 
risk equalization models through the method of constrained 
regression (CR). Conventional risk equalization models are 
usually estimated by means of ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Given a set of risk adjusters, OLS results in coefficients that 
minimize the sum of squared residuals. CR allows for esti-
mating coefficients that minimize the sum of squared residu-
als conditional on a pre-specified under- or overcompensa-
tion (for instance zero) for specific groups [29]. Previous 
research has shown that application of CR can improve pay-
ment fit for groups not explicitly flagged by risk adjusters. At 
the same time, CR typically worsens payment fit for groups 
explicitly flagged by risk adjusters. Van Kleef et al. [29] have 
applied CR in the Dutch context for the risk equalization 
model 2015 and concluded that the improved payment fit 
for some groups can potentially outweigh the deteriorated 
payment fit for other groups.
The aim of this study is to examine and evaluate the use 
of health survey information in risk equalization through 
CR. To do so, we use administrative data and health survey 
information from the Netherlands. The administrative data 
are from 2013 and contain information on medical spending 
and risk adjuster variables for the entire Dutch population 
(N ≈ 17 m). These data are used to replicate the Dutch risk 
equalization model of 2016. Furthermore, we use health 
survey data from 2012 based on a large sample of the Dutch 
population (N ≈ 387 k). We estimate six models, that is, one 
base model estimated with OLS (i.e., the Dutch risk equali-
zation model 2016) and five models estimated with CR.
Our empirical application comes with two methodo-
logical challenges. First, to meaningfully use health survey 
information as a basis for CR to improve risk equalization, 
this information must be representative for the population. 
As with most samples, this is not entirely the case for our 
survey sample. Prior studies have shown that this sample is 
somewhat healthier than the population [29, 37]. We address 
this by rebalancing the sample using a raking procedure [1, 
18] to correct for mismatches between the sample and the 
population. Second, a metric is required to evaluate the out-
comes of CR relative to OLS. We use a new standardized 
evaluation metric that summarizes under- and overcom-
pensations for a cross tabulation of two types of groups, 
i.e., groups explicitly flagged by risk adjusters (for which 
previous research has demonstrated an increase in under-/
overcompensation with CR compared to OLS) and groups 
not explicitly flagged by risk adjusters (for which previous 
research has shown a decrease in under-/overcompensation 
with CR compared to OLS). More specifically, we first cal-
culate the total under-/overcompensation per group, take the 
absolute value of these total under-/overcompensations, and 
then sum these over the relevant groups.
The structure of this paper is as follows. “The Dutch 
health insurance market” section describes relevant aspects 
of the Dutch health insurance system. “Literature review” 
section summarizes the relevant theory and previous 
research on selection via plan design and CR. “Data and 
methods” section describes the data and methods for our 
empirical application and “Results” section presents the 
results. Finally, “Discussion” section summarizes and dis-
cusses the main findings.
The Dutch health insurance market
The Dutch health insurance market has two main compo-
nents: a basic health insurance and a supplementary health 
insurance. Supplementary health insurance operates on the 
basis of free competition and is beyond the scope of this 
research. The basic health insurance operates on the basis 
of regulated competition. Regulations implemented by the 
Dutch government to ensure individual affordability and 
accessibility of the basic health insurance, include an indi-
vidual mandate to buy basic health insurance, annual open 
enrollment, community-rated premiums, risk equalization, 
and a standardized benefit package. The latter means that 
health plans have to cover a fixed set of benefits. Insurers are, 
however, free to selectively contract healthcare providers. 
Although this is intended to improve the efficiency of health 
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care, health plans can also use this instrument to engage in 
selection via plan design, e.g., by not contracting good qual-
ity health care for specific unprofitable groups of consumers, 
also known as ‘quality skimping’ [32, 36].
Risk equalization mitigates incentives for selection via 
plan design, given premium-rate restrictions. The risk 
equalization model is used to calculate risk-adjusted pay-
ments to health plans, based on the characteristics of their 
insured population. The Dutch risk equalization model is 
comprised of three separate models: one for somatic health 
care, one for mental health care, and one model for copay-
ments due to a mandatory deductible [32]. This research 
focuses on the model for somatic health care, which con-
tains the following indirect indicators of health: age, gen-
der, region, socioeconomic status, and source of income. 
In addition, the model includes the following series of 
more direct health indicators: pharmacy-based cost groups 
(PCGs), diagnosis-based cost groups (DCGs), multiple-year 
high cost groups (MHCGs), durable medical equipment cost 
groups (DMECGs), physiotherapy spending in the previous 
year, home care spending in the previous year, and geriat-
ric rehabilitation care spending in the previous year [32]. 
In this paper, we refer to these direct health indicators as 
‘morbidity-based risk adjusters’.
Literature review
Selection via plan design
The literature on (incentives for) selection via plan design 
originates from the work by Rothschild and Stiglitz [26], 
who were the first to show theoretically that insurers react 
to adverse selection incentives and try to attract good risks 
through insurance plans’ coverage and price. Glazer and 
McGuire [15] applied this to the health insurance market and 
further developed the ideas of Rothschild and Stiglitz [26] 
into a model of insurer and consumer behavior. Their model 
shows how profit-maximizing health insurers will engage in 
selection via plan design to attract good risks and deter bad 
ones, for example by creating networks in (dis)favor of some 
conditions and services. Breyer et al. [2] called this ‘indirect 
selection’. Furthermore, by applying the insights from Frank 
et al. [12], Ellis and McGuire [10] showed that health plan’s 
incentives to engage in selection via plan design depend on 
both ‘predictiveness’ and ‘predictability’ [10]. Services have 
predictiveness if use of these services correlates with use 
of other services covered by the health plan. Services are 
predictable when consumers can (to some extent) predict 
how much of those services which they will use during the 
contract period. When consumers take predicted use of ser-
vices into account when choosing a health plan, they will be 
sensitive to differences in health plan design with regard to 
those services. Consequently, health insurers can influence 
the choice of consumers through health plan design [9, 17, 
20, 22, 24]. McGuire et al. [24] added estimated demand 
elasticities to the predictiveness/predictability measures by 
studying incentives for selection via plan design in a market 
with risk adjustment, and again confirmed that health insur-
ers have incentives to deter bad risks through health plan 
design, specifically people with a chronic disease [24]. Ellis 
et al. [11] concluded that incorporating demand elasticities 
across services is necessary to accurately assess incentives 
for selection via plan design.
Other studies have investigated the actual occurrence of 
selection via plan design in health insurance markets. For 
example, Cao and McGuire [3] investigated the services 
offered by HMOs relative to the fee-for-service (FFS) sector 
within the Medicare program by researching the correlation 
between HMOs’ market shares and the average expenditures 
in the FFS sector. Their hypothesis is as follows. If HMOs 
try to deter consumers who are more likely to use a service, 
i.e., high-risk individuals, they are expected to underprovide 
that service. Consequently, the HMOs will selectively enroll 
low-risk individuals with regard to that service. As more 
low-risk individuals enroll in HMOs, the average risk in the 
FFS sector will increase, resulting in higher average expen-
ditures in the FFS sector. This all means that if service-level 
selection is present, the correlation between HMO market 
share and FFS average expenditures should be positive for 
services that the HMOs underprovide and negative for ser-
vices they overprovide. Indeed, this is exactly what Cao and 
McGuire [3] find. Also Eggleston and Bir [8], Ellis et al. [9], 
and Decoralis and Gugliemo [6] found evidence of health 
plans engaging in selection via plan design. Carey [4, 5], 
Lavetti and Simon [19], Geruso et al. [14], and Han and 
Lavetti [17] found evidence for selection via plan design by 
health plans with regard to prescription drugs and Shepard 
[28] showed the same for hospital network design.
In summary, existing literature suggests that incentives 
for selection via plan design are a function of consumers’ 
expected spending for services covered by health plans and 
their (un)profitability to plans. Empirical studies have shown 
that insurers respond to these incentives via the design of 
their plans.
Constrained regression
Conventional risk adjustment models are typically estimated 
with OLS, which—given a set of risk adjusters—results in 
coefficients that minimize the residual sum of squares. CR 
allows for estimating coefficients that minimize the residual 
sum of squares conditional on a constraint imposed by the 
researcher. An example of a constraint is that the under- 
or overcompensation for a certain group equals a specific 
amount, such as zero [29].
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Previous research has shown that—compared to OLS—
use of CR in risk equalization comes with a trade-off 
between improved compensation for groups not explicitly 
flagged by risk adjusters and worsened compensation for 
groups explicitly flagged by risk adjusters. To make a well-
informed trade-off, Van Kleef et al. [29] argue that it is 
important to carefully define the groups that are vulnerable 
to risk selection. In addition, they argue that the relative 
importance of under-/overcompensations might vary with 
the size and sign (positive or negative) of the compensa-
tion. The authors find that under certain circumstances, 
the improvement in compensation for groups not explicitly 
flagged by risk adjusters can outweigh the deterioration in 
compensation of groups that are explicitly flagged by risk 
adjusters [29].
Van Kleef et al. [29] were not the first to study the use of 
CR in the context of risk equalization. Glazer and McGuire 
[16] already proposed including constraints in risk equaliza-
tion to improve incentives for health plans. Starting from a 
model of insurer and consumer behavior, they showed that 
the optimal risk equalization coefficients result from CR 
with constraints for each of the separate services that health 
plans are able to distort. Layton et al. [21] have empirically 
implemented this approach. A key difference between the 
present study and the studies mentioned above is that here 
the information used as a basis for constraints does not come 
from administrative data that are available for the entire pop-
ulation, but from a health survey that is only available for a 
sample of the population.
Data and methods
Data
To study the effects of including health survey information 
in the Dutch risk equalization model through CR, we merge 
administrative data from 2013 with health survey data from 
2012. The administrative data come from various adminis-
trative sources and contain information on individual-level 
medical spending and risk adjusters for all Dutch citizens 
with a basic health insurance in 2013 (n = 16.9 million). 
The health survey data contain information on self-reported 
general health as well as specific self-reported chronic con-
ditions for 387,195 individuals who were 19 years or older 
on September 1, 2012 and come from Statistics Netherlands 
[37]. The data sets were merged using a unique anonymized 
individual-level identification key.
Rebalancing
The survey sample used for this study is somewhat over-
represented by relatively healthy individuals [29, 38]. To 
correct for differences in health as well as in age and socio-
economic factors between the survey sample and the popula-
tion, we rebalanced the sample by means of a raking proce-
dure which was originally developed by Deming [7]. This 
procedure generates individual-level weights that equalize 
the frequencies of key variables in the sample to those in 
the population [1, 18]. To see how this procedure works, 
imagine a sample that needs to be made representative for 
a population with respect to age and gender. As the joint 
distribution of these variables is only known in the sample, 
first a cross tabulation of age and gender is made for the 
sample (say 20 categories for age and 2 for gender which 
results in 20 × 2 = 40 cells). Next, for each separate row (say 
an age category), each entry of that row is multiplied by the 
ratio of the population total to the sample total for that age 
category, such that the row totals for the sample equal those 
for the population. Therefore, for each of the 20 rows/age 
categories, the 2 entries of gender are multiplied by the rel-
evant ratio of the population total to the sample total. Then, 
this step is repeated for the columns (gender), after which 
the column totals will equal those in the population. The 
row totals (age categories), however, will no longer agree, 
although they are closer to the population totals than before 
the first iteration for the rows. This process is continued until 
agreement for both rows and columns is achieved [1, 18].
In addition to age and gender, our raking procedure 
includes all other risk adjuster classes of the risk equaliza-
tion model 2016 (see Van Kleef et al. [32] for a complete 
list). Furthermore, the procedure also includes a proxy for 
whether or not someone had died in 2013 as well as 18 quan-
tiles of mean total medical spending. The next section pre-
sents the representativeness of the sample before and after 
rebalancing.
Representativeness of survey sample
The survey sample includes 387,195 respondents of which 
384,004 successfully merged with the administrative data 
of 2013. Unsuccessful matches can occur due to migration 
and death. After removing records with missing values on 
self-reported general health, 379,054 individuals remained 
for the analyses. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency in 
the sample and the total population, respectively, for the 
seven morbidity-based risk adjusters included in the risk 
equalization model 2016. Before rebalancing, the sample is 
overrepresented by people with morbidity. After rebalanc-
ing, the relative frequencies in the sample are close to those 
in the total population. For the same set of risk adjusters, 
Fig. 2 shows the average spending in the sample and the 
total population, respectively. Here too, the sample matches 
the population relatively well, especially after rebalancing. 
Appendix 1 shows similar patterns for other partitions of 
the population.
Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained…
1 3
Recalibrating the balanced survey sample
The Dutch risk equalization model is estimated with OLS. A 
property of OLS is that the mean predicted spending in the 
estimation data set equals the mean spending in that data set, 
implying that the residual spending has a mean of zero. This 
is not necessarily the case for subsamples drawn from the 
estimation data set, such as our health survey sample. Before 
rebalancing, the average spending in the survey sample 
equals 3190 euros and the predicted spending 3223 euros, 
leaving a mean residual of − 33 euros per person per year. 
After rebalancing, the mean spending equals 2429 euros and 
the mean predicted spending equals 2438 euros, leaving a 
mean residual of − 9 euros. To correct for this remaining 
discrepancy, we recalibrated spending in the rebalanced 
sample by multiplying individual-level spending by a factor 
of 1.003767 (= 2438/2429), so that the mean residual spend-
ing in the sample equals zero.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
PCG DCG MHCG DMECG Physiotherapy
t-1
Home care t-1 Geriatric
rehabilitaon
care t-1
Po
pu
la
o
n 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Sample (unbalanced) Sample (rebalanced) Total Dutch adult populaon
Fig. 1  Frequencies per morbidity-based risk adjuster for the (un)
balanced sample and total Dutch adult population. The horizontal 
axis shows groups of individuals flagged by a morbidity-based risk 
adjuster included in the Dutch risk equalization model 2016. The 
abbreviations refer to pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs), diagnosis-
based cost groups (DCGs), multiple-year high cost groups (MHCGs), 
and durable medical equipment cost groups (DMECG)
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Fig. 2  Average spending per morbidity-based risk adjuster for the 
(un)balanced sample and total Dutch adult population. The horizontal 
axis shows groups of individuals flagged by a morbidity-based risk 
adjuster included in the Dutch risk equalization model 2016. The 
abbreviations refer to pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs), diagnosis-
based cost groups (DCGs), multiple-year high cost groups (MHCGs), 
and durable medical equipment cost groups (DMECG)
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Methods
Model specification
To analyze the effects of incorporating self-reported health 
measures in risk equalization via CR, we estimated six mod-
els. The first model is the actual Dutch risk equalization 
model of 2016 (see “The Dutch health insurance market” 
section) estimated with OLS. The other five models mimic 
the risk equalization model of 2016, but are estimated by 
CR. In the CR models, the under-/overcompensations of 
the group with a fair or (very) poor self-reported general 
health and the group with a (very) good self-reported general 
health are reduced by 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100%, respec-
tively. Technically, imposing the constraints means that for 
each of the two groups of self-reported general health, the 
sum product of risk adjuster values and estimated coeffi-
cients (i.e., total predicted spending for a group) equals a 
pre-specified amount. In an initial pass, the survey data are 
used to determine the risk adjuster values as well as the ‘pre-
specified amounts’ corresponding to the above-mentioned 
20–40–60–80–100% reductions in under-/overcompensa-
tions for the relevant groups.
Evaluation
Prior research has shown that CR can improve compensa-
tion for some groups and worsen compensation for others. 
To evaluate the outcomes, we first calculated the under-/
overcompensations based on the OLS model and the five 
CR models for selected survey groups that are not explicitly 
flagged by risk adjusters in the risk equalization model, as 
well as for selected groups that are explicitly flagged by risk 
adjusters in that model. Under-/overcompensation is defined 
as the spending predicted by the risk equalization model 
minus the actual spending. The survey groups are based on 
self-reported general health, the number of self-reported 
chronic conditions and specific self-reported chronic con-
ditions (see Appendix 2). Regarding the groups explicitly 
flagged by risk adjusters, we focus on those flagged by the 
seven morbidity-based risk adjusters (see “The Dutch health 
insurance market” section).
Second, we constructed a standardized metric to evaluate 
the outcomes of CR compared to OLS in terms of group-
level payment fit. Four groups are used for this part of 
the evaluation, i.e., yes/no (very) good self-reported gen-
eral health (based on the health survey) cross tabulated 
with yes/no morbidity. The morbidity group is defined as 
being flagged by at least one of the seven morbidity-based 
risk adjusters of the risk equalization model and the non-
morbidity group is defined as being flagged by none of the 
seven morbidity-based risk adjusters. In this metric, we 
first calculate the total under-/overcompensation for the 
relevant groups. Next, we take the absolute values of these 
total under-/overcompensations and then sum these over the 
groups. For simplicity and interpretation purposes, we stand-
ardize the metric by taking the ratio of the outcome for a CR 
model to the outcome of the OLS model. Our measure can 
be written as follows:
where: iϵg = the individuals belonging to group g; rcr,i = the 
under-/overcompensation based on constrained regression 
for individual i; rols,i = the under-/overcompensation based 
on OLS for individual i;
When S > 1, the outcomes of OLS are preferred over the 
outcomes of CR, while the opposite holds when S < 1.
Results
“Individual-level fit” section presents and compares the 
outcomes of the six models in terms of individual-level fit. 
“Mean under-/overcompensation for groups identified in 
the survey data” section presents the results under all six 
models for groups defined by self-reported general health 
and specific self-reported chronic conditions. The results 
for the groups explicitly flagged by the morbidity-based risk 
adjusters in the risk equalization model 2016 are presented 
in “Mean under-/overcompensation for groups flagged 
by morbidity-based risk adjusters in the risk equalization 
model” section. Then, “Mean per person under-/overcom-
pensation for a cross tabulation of groups identified in the 
survey data and groups flagged by morbidity-based risk 
adjusters in the risk equalization model” section presents 
the outcomes of the six models in terms of metric (1). In our 
primary analyses, groups are weighted equally. Acknowledg-
ing that regulators might have reason to give more weight 
to some groups than to others, “Differentiated weighting of 
subgroups” section illustrates the effects of a form of dif-
ferentiated weighting.
Individual‑level fit
Table 1 shows the individual-level R-squared1 and Cum-
mings’ Prediction Measure (CPM)2 for each model. As can 
be seen, for all CR models, the R-squared is lower com-
pared to that of the OLS model. Furthermore, the R-squared 
(1)S =
∑4
g=1
(
���
∑
i∈g rcr,i
���)
∑4
g=1
(
���
∑
i∈g rols,i
���)
,
1 R − squared = 1 −
∑n
i=1 (yi−ŷi)
2
∑n
i=1 (yi−ȳ)
2 .
2 CPM = 1 −
∑n
i=1 �yi − ŷi�∑n
i=1 �yi− ȳ� .
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decreases as the constraint gets heavier. Under OLS, the 
residual sum of squares is minimized given the set of risk 
adjusters implying that—compared to OLS—any constraint 
of this type will result in a larger residual sum of squares. 
However, from the figures in Table 1, it can be concluded 
that imposing the constraints results in a very small reduc-
tion in payment fit at the individual level for both the 
R-squared and the CPM.
Mean under‑/overcompensation for groups 
identified in the survey data
To illustrate the effect of imposing the constraints, Table 2 
presents the mean per person under-/overcompensation 
based on all six models for selected survey groups. As 
expected, under the CR models the under-/overcompen-
sation for the two groups defined by self-reported general 
health (i.e., the groups on which the constraints are based) 
are reduced by 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100% compared to the 
OLS model.3
The per person undercompensation for the group with 
at least one self-reported chronic condition in the past 
year changes from − 122 under OLS to − 92 euros under 
CR-20% to 28 euros under CR-100%. A similar pattern can 
be observed for most of the other groups of chronically ill 
individuals. The group who has ever suffered from diabetes 
is on average even overcompensated by 538 euros per person 
per year under the CR-100% model, while OLS yields an 
undercompensation of 192 euros for this group. For the com-
plementary groups of healthy individuals [i.e., those without 
the respective chronic condition(s)], the overcompensation 
generated by OLS mostly changes to an undercompensa-
tion under the CR-100% model. For example, for the group 
who reported no chronic condition in the last 12 months, 
the overcompensation of 178 euros under OLS turns into an 
undercompensation of 60 euros under the CR-100% model. 
Table 2 shows that the under- and overcompensations for 
all groups change linearly across the different CR models.
Table 2 also reports results for groups of survey respond-
ents for whom the relevant information is missing. As can 
be seen, these groups have higher mean spending than the 
groups without the relevant chronic condition(s). In addition, 
the change in compensation when moving from OLS to CR 
follows the same pattern as that of the chronically ill groups, 
indicating that the missing groups are overrepresented by 
relatively unhealthy individuals.
Appendix 2 shows the same results for the 19 specific 
chronic conditions that survey respondents reported (not) to 
be suffering from in the past 12 months. Again, the chroni-
cally ill groups receive more compensation under CR than 
under OLS, while the overcompensations for the healthy 
counterparts decrease slightly.
Mean under‑/overcompensation for groups flagged 
by morbidity‑based risk adjusters in the risk 
equalization model
Table 3 presents the mean per person under-/overcompen-
sation under all six models for yes/no morbidity as well 
as separately for the seven morbidity-based risk adjusters 
in the risk equalization model of 2016. The mean under-/
overcompensation for all groups is zero under OLS, except 
for the PCG group. The reason for this is that the PCG 
classes are not mutually exclusive, while the classes within 
all other risk adjusters are. For all other morbidity-based 
risk adjusters, the mean compensation under OLS is zero 
as this is a property of OLS. Under CR, however, this is 
no longer the case. As Table 3 shows, the compensation 
for the groups with morbidity increases as the constraint 
becomes heavier. Under the CR-100% model, all groups 
explicitly flagged by a morbidity-based risk adjuster have a 
Table 1  Description and outcomes of the six models
Model R-squared (%) CPM (%)
OLS (0%) 27.9 29.9
CR-20%: constrained regression model with 20% reduction of under-/overcompensations for the two groups based 
on self-reported general health
27.9 30.0
CR-40%: constrained regression model with 40% reduction of under-/overcompensations for the two groups based 
on self-reported general health
27.8 30.0
CR-60%: constrained regression model with 60% reduction of under-/overcompensations for the two groups based 
on self-reported general health
27.8 29.9
CR-80%: constrained regression model with 80% reduction of under-/overcompensations for the two groups based 
on self-reported general health
27.7 29.7
CR-100%: constrained regression model with 100% reduction of under-/overcompensations for the two groups based 
on self-reported general health
27.6 29.3
3 The under-/overcompensations do not exactly equal zero under the 
CR-100% model due to the recalibration of actual spending in the 
survey data (see “Recalibrating the balanced survey sample” section).
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mean overcompensation of at least 600 euros and the entire 
group of individuals flagged by at least one morbidity-based 
risk adjuster (yes morbidity) has a mean overcompensation 
of 548 euros. In contrast, the compensation for all the com-
plementary groups of healthy people decreases. Under the 
CR-100% model, the entire group of individuals not flagged 
by a morbidity-based risk adjuster is on average undercom-
pensated by 183 euros per person per year.
Mean per person under‑/overcompensation 
for a cross tabulation of groups identified 
in the survey data and groups flagged 
by morbidity‑based risk adjusters in the risk 
equalization model
Even though average compensation increases for chronically 
ill groups, this is not necessarily the case for subsamples of 
these groups. To illustrate this, Fig. 3 cross tabulates the two 
groups based on self-reported general health and the two 
groups based on yes/no morbidity as identified by the risk 
equalization model. The results show that within the group 
with a fair or (very) poor self-reported general health, the 
individuals flagged by a morbidity indicator (20.2% of pop-
ulation) receive more compensation under CR than under 
OLS (i.e., from − 455 euros under the OLS (0%) to 356 
euros per person per year under the CR-100% model). How-
ever, the group of individuals who reported their health to 
be fair or (very) poor but who are not flagged by a morbidity 
indicator (7.4% of population), receive slightly less com-
pensation under CR. As a result, the compensation for this 
subgroup decreases from − 564 euros under OLS (0%) to 
− 608 euros per person per year under the CR-100% model. 
A similar pattern can be observed within the group of people 
who reported a (very) good general health. The individuals 
Table 2  Mean under-/overcompensation by six models in euros per person per year for groups identified in the health survey
OLS ordinary least squares, CR constrained regression
*Statistically significantly different from zero (P < 0.05)
Survey group Size of 
group (%)
Mean spending in 
euros (2013)
Mean under-/overcompensation per person per year in euros (2013)
OLS (0%) CR-20% CR-40% CR-60% CR-80% CR-100%
Self-reported general health
 Fair, poor or very poor 27.6 5602 − 494* − 396* − 297* − 198* − 100* − 1
 Good or very good 72.4 1439 156* 125* 93* 62* 31* − 1
Self-reported chronic condi-
tion (past 12 months)
 At least one 60.1 3376 − 122* − 92* − 62* − 32* − 2 28*
 None 28.2 1010 178* 130* 83* 35* − 13* − 60*
 1 25.6 2182 50* 41* 31* 22* 13 4
 2 15.1 3095 − 126* − 105* − 83* − 61* − 39* − 17
 3 8.4 4352 − 348* − 289* − 229* − 169* − 109* − 49*
 4 11.0 6443 − 427* − 297* − 166* − 36* 95* 226*
 Missing 11.7 2396 26* 29* 33* 37* 41* 45*
Diabetes (ever)
 Yes 8.2 6739 − 192* − 46* 99* 246* 392* 538*
 No 86.9 2116 16 4 − 7 − 18 − 28* − 39*
 Missing 5.0 3077 − 47* − 27* − 6 14 34* 55*
Stroke (ever)
 Yes 4.2 7626 − 811* − 686* − 561* − 435* − 310* − 184*
 No 91.6 2251 28* 23* 18 14 9 4
 Missing 4.2 2903 − 57* − 42* − 27* − 12 3 18
Heart attack (ever)
 Yes 5.0 7631 − 456* − 320* − 184* − 47* 89* 225*
 No 90.9 2241 19 13 8 3 − 3 − 8
 Missing 4.1 2955 − 76* − 61* − 45* − 29* − 14 2
Cancer (ever)
 Yes 9.9 6517 − 433* − 351* − 270* − 188* − 106* − 24
 No 86.3 2122 34* 26* 20* 13 6 − 1
 Missing 3.8 2739 − 33* − 21 − 10 2 14 26*
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who reported a (very) good general health and who are 
flagged by a morbidity indicator in the risk equalization 
model (21.2% of population) receive more compensation 
under CR than under OLS (i.e., from 479 euros under OLS 
(0%) to 802 euros per person per year under the CR-100% 
model). The individuals who reported a (very) good general 
health but are not flagged by a morbidity indicator (51.2% of 
population) receive less compensation under CR than under 
OLS (i.e., from 72 euros under OLS (0%) to − 209 euros per 
person per year under the CR-100% model).
In Fig. 3, it is not obvious which of the models leads to 
the best outcomes overall. Figure 4 presents the outcomes 
of metric S (Eq. 1) which summarizes the outcomes over the 
four subgroups presented in Fig. 3. This metric first calcu-
lates the total under-/overcompensation per group, takes the 
absolute value of these total under-/overcompensations and 
sums these over the four groups. The metric compares the 
outcomes of a CR model relative to OLS. When S < 1, a CR 
model outperforms OLS, while S > 1 implies the opposite. 
Figure 4 shows that S < 1 for the CR-20%, CR-40%, and 
CR-60% models, indicating that these models perform bet-
ter than OLS with respect to the groups analyzed here. The 
CR-40% model has the lowest S-value (i.e. 0.81), indicating 
that overall this model performs best (given our choice of 
groups). For the CR-80% and CR-100% models, S > 1, indi-
cating that these models perform worse than OLS (0%), with 
respect to these groups. In addition, we also see that CR in 
risk equalization can be pushed too far: applying a stricter 
constraint can cause the S-value to increase again.
Differentiated weighting of subgroups
In Fig. 4 (the under-/overcompensations of), all four groups 
are weighted equally. In practice, however, regulators might 
Table 3  Mean under-/overcompensation by six models in euros per person per year for groups (not) flagged by the morbidity-based risk adjust-
ers of the risk equalization model 2016
Morbidity is defined as being classified in one of the seven morbidity-based risk adjusters of the risk equalization model. No morbidity is 
defined as being classified in none of the seven morbidity-based risk adjusters of the risk equalization model 2016
OLS ordinary least squares, CR constrained regression, PCGs pharmacy-based cost groups, DCGs diagnosis-based cost groups, MHCGs multi-
ple-year high cost groups, DMECG durable medical equipment cost groups
*Statistically significantly different from zero (P < 0.05)
Group Size of 
group (%)
Mean spending in 
euros (2013)
Mean under-/overcompensation per person per year in euros (2013)
OLS (0%) CR-20% CR-40% CR-60% CR-80% CR-100%
Morbidity
 Yes 25.0 5584 2 111* 220* 330* 439* 548*
 No 75.0 978 − 1 − 37* − 74* − 110* − 147* − 183*
PCG
 Yes 19.3 5669 15* 134* 255* 375* 496* 616*
 No 80.7 1286 − 3* − 32* − 61* − 90* − 118* − 147*
DCG
 Yes 9.3 8179 0 145* 291* 437* 583* 729*
 No 90.7 1514 0 − 15* − 30* − 45* − 59* − 74*
MYHCG
 Yes 5.8 12,137 0 211* 423* 634* 846* 1057*
 No 94.2 1524 0 − 13* − 26* − 38* − 51* − 64*
DMECG
 Yes 0.9 14,727 0 167* 335* 502* 670* 838*
 No 99.1 2020 0 − 1 − 3 − 4* − 6* − 7*
Physiotherapy t-1
 Yes 2.0 8769 0 156* 313* 470* 627* 784*
 No 98.0 1998 0 − 3* − 6* − 9* − 13* − 16*
Home care t-1
 Yes 2.2 16,658 0 231* 463* 695* 927* 1158*
 No 97.8 1827 0 − 5* − 10* − 15* − 19* − 24*
Geriatric rehabilita-
tion care t-1
 Yes 0.2 13,372 0 210* 422* 633* 844* 1055*
 No 99.8 2109 0 0 − 1 − 1 − 2 − 2
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have reason to give more weight to some groups than to 
others. This might be the case when the regulator believes 
that some selection actions are more harmful than others. 
“Literature review” section supports this as it shows that 
under-/overcompensation and the resulting selection actions 
for some groups might be more problematic compared to 
-800 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000
Financial result OLS; 0% Financial result CR-20% Financial result CR-40%
Financial result CR-60% Financial result CR-80% Financial result CR-100%
Fair or (very) poor general 
health and no morbidity
(size=7.4%; average 
spending= €1817)
Fair or (very) poor 
general health and 
morbidity
(size=20.2%; average 
spending= €7827)
(Very) good general 
health and no morbidity
(size=51.2%; average 
spending= €926)
(Very) good general 
health and morbidity
(size=21.2%; average 
spending= €3415)
Fig. 3  Mean under-/overcompensations under six models in euros per 
person per year for groups based on a cross tabulation of self-reported 
general health by yes/no morbidity. The abbreviations stand for ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and constrained regression (CR). Morbidity 
is defined as being classified in one of the seven morbidity-based risk 
adjusters of the risk equalization model. No morbidity is defined as 
being classified in none of the seven morbidity-based risk adjusters of 
the risk equalization model
0
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Fig. 4  Outcomes of six models for metric S for groups based on a 
cross tabulation of self-reported general health and yes/no morbidity. 
The abbreviations stand for ordinary least squares (OLS) and con-
strained regression (CR). Metric S is calculated using Eq.  (1). The 
constraint is a % reduction in under- and overcompensation on the 
group with a (very) good general health and the group with a fair or 
(very) poor general health
Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained…
1 3
others. For example, the regulator might consider ‘qual-
ity skimping’ through selection via plan design to be more 
harmful for the functioning of the healthcare system than 
‘selective marketing’. In such a situation, the regulator might 
give more weight to groups that are particularly vulnerable 
to ‘quality skimping’ (e.g., groups of chronically ill people 
with high expected spending) than to groups that are more 
likely to be subject to ‘selective marketing’ (e.g., groups of 
healthy people). In addition, the regulator might consider an 
undercompensation, which incentivizes insurers to under-
serve people, to be more harmful than an overcompensation, 
which incentivizes insurers to overserve people. Although it 
is not our goal here to advocate a specific form of differenti-
ated weighting of subgroups, we believe that it is instructive 
to indicate how weighting could influence the outcomes of 
the models simulated here.
Figure 5 compares the results of the CR models under 
equal weighting of subgroups with those under differentiated 
weighting of subgroups. The data series ‘equal-weighting’ is 
equivalent to the results of Fig. 4. The data series ‘differenti-
ated weighting’ presents the results of the CR models rela-
tive to OLS with two types of differentiated weighting: (1) 
groups with high expected spending are given more weight 
than those with low expected spending (in our illustration: 
through weighting with the average spending of the groups) 
and (2) undercompensations are given more weight than 
overcompensations (in our illustration: through weighting 
an undercompensation twice as heavy as an overcompensa-
tion). A regulator might consider the first type of weighting 
when it is particularly concerned about quality skimping, for 
instance through selection via plan design. A regulator might 
think about the second type of weighting when ‘underserv-
ing’ is considered more harmful than ‘overserving’.
Figure 5 shows that the line for ‘differentiated weight-
ing’ of subgroups lies below the line of ‘equal-weighting’ 
of subgroups. This indicates that differentiated weighting 
of subgroups can substantially affect the outcomes of con-
strained regression compared to OLS. The results in Fig. 5 
also show that under ‘differentiated weighting’, the lowest 
value for S is to be found for the CR-60% model instead of 
the CR-40% model. This indicates that the optimal speci-
fication of a constraint can be affected by how a regulator 
weights the subgroups of interest.
Discussion
Most health insurance markets with premium-rate restric-
tions include a risk equalization system to compensate 
health insurers for predictable variation in spending. Recent 
research has shown, however, that even the most sophis-
ticated risk equalization systems tend to undercompensate 
(overcompensate) people with poor (good) self-reported 
health, which confronts insurers with selection incentives. 
Self-reported health measures are generally considered 
infeasible for use as ‘risk adjusters’ in the risk equalization 
model. The aim of this paper was to examine and evaluate an 
alternative way of including self-reported health measures 
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Fig. 5  Outcomes of six models for metric S with equal weight-
ing and differentiated weighting of subgroups. The outcomes with 
equal weighting of subgroups are calculated using Eq. (1). Differen-
tiated weighting means that the result for each of the four groups is 
weighted with the average spending of that group and that an under-
compensation is weighted twice as heavy as an overcompensation. 
The horizontal axis represents the different models. The series ’equal 
weighting’ is equivalent to the outcomes of Fig. 4
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in risk equalization, namely through constrained regression 
(CR). To do so, we estimated five CR models and compared 
these with the actual Dutch risk equalization model of 2016 
estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). In the CR mod-
els, coefficients were estimated by least-squares regression 
given that the under-/overcompensation for two groups 
based on self-reported general health are reduced by 20, 40, 
60, 80, or 100%.
We first calculated the under- and overcompensations for 
selected survey groups and groups flagged by the morbidity-
based risk adjusters included in the risk equalization model. 
For the survey groups, the results showed that the chroni-
cally ill receive more compensation under CR compared 
to OLS, while the opposite is true for the complementary 
groups of healthy people. We observed a similar pattern for 
the groups (not) explicitly flagged by a morbidity-based risk 
adjuster; the groups that were explicitly flagged by such a 
risk adjuster receive more compensation under CR com-
pared to OLS and the groups not explicitly flagged receive 
less. Next, we researched subsamples of these groups by 
cross tabulating the groups yes/no (very) good self-reported 
general health with the groups yes/no explicitly flagged 
by at least one morbidity-based risk adjuster. The results 
showed that—compared to OLS—also within the groups of 
self-reported general health, the CR models move money 
from the individuals not flagged by a morbidity-based risk 
adjuster to those flagged by such a risk adjuster. Conse-
quently, we found that payment fit improves for some groups 
but worsens for others. Van Kleef et al. [33] reported similar 
findings.
To evaluate the outcomes under all six models, we con-
structed a standardized metric that summarizes the abso-
lute under-/overcompensations for relevant subgroups. We 
evaluated the four groups resulting from the cross tabula-
tion of yes/no (very) good self-reported general health with 
the groups yes/no explicitly flagged by at least one mor-
bidity-based risk adjuster. In this metric, we take the abso-
lute values of the total under-/overcompensations and sum 
these over the four groups. The metric then compares the 
outcomes of a CR model relative to OLS. We find that the 
CR-20%, CR-40%, and CR-60% models yield more prefer-
able outcomes than OLS, with the CR-40% model yielding 
the best results (i.e., for the groups analyzed here). This find-
ing shows that a relatively small constraint could already 
improve conventional risk equalization. This is in line with 
the conclusions drawn in the paper by Van Kleef et al. [29] 
and with the findings of the work by Glazer & McGuire [15, 
16]. Glazer and McGuire [15, 16] argued that conventional 
risk equalization estimated with OLS might not be optimal 
and that overpaying groups flagged as ‘high risk’ and under-
paying groups of ‘low risk’ could improve the outcomes of 
risk equalization. However, our results also show that CR 
in risk equalization can be pushed too far, since the metric 
increases sharply as the constraint becomes heavier, with the 
CR-80% and CR-100% models performing worse than OLS.
Our primary simulations assume equal weighting of (the 
under-/overcompensations of) subgroups. Acknowledging 
that regulators might consider the effects of some selection 
actions to be more harmful than others, we also examined 
how differentiated weighting could influence the model out-
comes. We found that a specific form of weighting (based 
on assumptions about the effects of quality skimping and 
underserving versus overserving) substantially affects the 
outcomes of the CR models relative to OLS. These results 
demonstrate the relevance of carefully defining the policy 
objectives which regulators want to include in the evaluation.
The results of this study indicate that the use of health 
survey information in risk equalization through CR can 
be promising in reducing incentives for selection via plan 
design. Practical implementation of survey information in 
risk equalization through CR, however, needs more work. 
First, evaluation can be more refined, for example by evalu-
ating the outcomes using other and more groups than ana-
lyzed here. In addition, more refined evaluation of risk 
equalization models could require a welfare approach that 
incorporates how incentives affect the behavior of insurers, 
how this behavior of insurers interacts with the behavior of 
consumers, and how this affects social welfare. Although 
such a welfare approach is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we believe that further research into this direction can help 
to improve the evaluation of risk equalization systems. Sec-
ond, the choice of groups on which the constraints are based 
can differ from the groups used is this research. This choice 
is, however, not ours to make. The method of CR offers 
regulators an effective tool for protecting specific groups of 
interest against selection via plan design [29]. An important 
insight in this respect is that these groups can also be deter-
mined on subsamples of the population, as long as these 
subsamples are representative for the population.
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Appendix 1: Representativeness 
of the survey sample by decile of spending
The representativeness of the sample (before and after rebal-
ancing) for the population can also be shown using deciles of 
spending instead of the morbidity adjusters. Figure 6 shows 
the relative frequency per decile of actual medical spending 
for the unbalanced sample (dotted bars), rebalanced sam-
ple (empty bars), and the total adult population (solid bars). 
Before rebalancing, the sample is clearly overrepresented 
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Fig. 6  Frequencies per decile of spending for the (un)balanced sam-
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by high spenders. After rebalancing, the relative frequency 
per decile of spending in the survey sample matches that of 
the population.
Figure 7 presents the average spending per decile of 
spending. Patterns in the sample are in line with those in 
the population, before but especially after rebalancing.
Appendix 2: Under‑/overcompensation 
for survey groups regarding self‑reported 
conditions under OLS and constrained 
regression
Table 4 shows the under-/overcompensations for survey 
groups regarding self-reported conditions in the last 12 
months under OLS and constrained regression.
Table 4  Under-/overcompensations in euros for survey groups of specific self-reported conditions in the last 12 months estimated with ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and constrained regression (CR)
Groups Size (%) Mean spend-
ing in euros
Mean under-/overcompensation per person per year in euros (2013)
OLS (0%) CR-20% CR-40% CR-60% CR-80% CR-100%
Stroke
 Yes 0.7 9117 − 722* − 561* − 399* − 237* − 75* 87*
 No 95.3 2368 9 7 5 3 1 − 1
 Missing 4.0 3074 − 92* − 74* − 57* − 39* − 21 − 4
Heart attack
 Yes 0.5 8509 − 503* − 333* − 162* 9 180* 351*
 No 95.3 2376 7 4 3 1 − 1 − 3
 Missing 4.2 3102 − 82* − 62* − 43* − 23* − 4 16
Heart condition
 Yes 3.2 8918 − 790* − 630* − 469* − 309* − 148* 12
 No 92.6 2267 18 13 8 4 − 1 − 6
 Missing 4.2 2908 − 7 10 27* 44* 62* 79*
Cancer
 Yes 2.8 10,444 − 1137* − 1022* − 905* − 789* − 673* − 557*
 No 93.0 2260 23* 20* 17 14 10 7
 Missing 4.2 2969 − 45* − 28* − 11 6 23* 40*
Migraine
 Yes 12.4 2286 − 107* − 98* − 89* − 81* − 72* − 63*
 No 74.5 2341 30* 24* 17 11 5 − 1
 Missing 13.1 3193 − 48* − 23 2 28* 53* 79*
Blood pressure
 Yes 22.0 4415 − 208* − 150* − 91* − 32* 27 86*
 No 65.4 1897 49* 32* 15 − 2 − 19* − 35*
 Missing 12.7 3035 − 17 4 26* 48* 69* 91*
Blood vessels
 Yes 3.6 7507 − 552* − 421* − 291* − 160* − 29 102*
 No 83.6 2198 20* 13 5 − 2 − 9 − 16
 Missing 12.7 3081 − 28* − 5 18 41* 64* 88*
Asthma
 Yes 8.6 4702 − 263* − 182* − 100* − 19 63* 144*
 No 78.9 2127 28* 16 5 − 6 − 18 − 29*
 Missing 12.5 3035 − 16 6 28* 51* 73* 95*
Psoriasis
 Yes 2.9 3743 − 383* − 349* − 314* − 280* − 245* − 211*
 No 83.8 2290 13 7 2 − 3 − 8 − 13
 Missing 13.3 3156 − 5 21 48* 74* 101* 127*
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*Statistically significantly different from zero (P < 0.05)
Table 4  (continued)
Groups Size (%) Mean spend-
ing in euros
Mean under-/overcompensation per person per year in euros (2013)
OLS (0%) CR-20% CR-40% CR-60% CR-80% CR-100%
Eczema
 Yes 4.2 2758 − 150* − 136* − 122* − 108* − 94* − 80*
 No 83.0 2316 15 10 6 1 − 3 − 8
 Missing 12.8 3142 − 44* − 20 5 30* 54* 79*
Severe/recurring dizziness
 Yes 4.3 5772 − 502* − 400* − 299* − 197* − 95* 7
 No 82.9 2180 28* 19* 11 2 − 6 − 15
 Missing 12.8 3095 − 27* − 3 21 45* 68* 92*
Severe/recurring disease of intestines
 Yes 4.4 5273 − 590* − 514* − 438* − 362* − 285* − 209*
 No 83.1 2202 34* 26* 19 12 4 − 3
 Missing 12.4 3076 − 26* − 3 20 43* 66* 90*
Incontinence
 Yes 8.2 5579 − 240* − 154* − 67* 19 105* 191*
 No 79.0 2099 24* 13 3 − 7 − 17 − 28*
 Missing 12.8 3085 − 36* − 13 10 34* 57* 80*
Wear of joint
 Yes 18.6 4858 − 267* − 191* − 115* − 39* 37* 113*
 No 69.2 1929 48* 31* 14 − 2 − 19* − 36*
 Missing 12.2 2982 − 10 11 32* 53* 74* 95*
Joint inflammation
 Yes 6.4 5804 − 354* − 241* − 127* − 14 100* 214*
 No 80.8 2143 24* 13 3 − 8 − 18 − 28*
 Missing 12.8 3076 − 18 5 29* 52* 76* 100*
Severe/recurring condition of back
 Yes 11.0 3987 − 233* − 174* − 115* − 55* 4 64*
 No 76.5 2151 33* 21* 10 − 1 − 12 − 23*
 Missing 12.5 3023 − 20 2 25* 47* 69* 92*
Severe/recurring condition of neck
 Yes 10.1 3706 − 171* − 117* − 63* − 9 45* 100*
 No 77.3 2191 25* 15 5 − 5 − 15 − 25*
 Missing 12.5 3064 − 32* − 10 12 34* 56* 78*
Severe/recurring condition of elbow
 Yes 6.9 4378 − 184* − 112* − 39* 33* 106* 179*
 No 80.4 2193 20* 10 1 − 8 − 17 − 26*
 Missing 12.7 3100 − 39* − 17 7 30* 53* 76*
Other
 Yes 15.0 4860 − 375* − 311* − 247* − 183* − 118* − 54*
 No 74.6 1900 74* 58* 43* 27* 12 − 3
 Missing 10.4 3092 − 34* − 10 14 38* 62* 86*
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